Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World: Fiscal Implications of Reform by Paul Bingley et al.
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the
National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Social Security Programs and Retirement
around the World: Fiscal Implications of Reform
Volume Author/Editor: Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise,
editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-31017-5; 978-0-226-31017-6
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/grub07-1
Publication Date: October 2007
Title: Fiscal Implications of Reforms in Retirement Systems
in Denmark
Author: Paul Bingley, Nabanita Datta Gupta, Peder J. Pedersen
URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c00533.1 Introduction
Like most other OECD countries, Denmark faces a demographic
change of major dimensions in the coming decades. The expected change
in Denmark is, however, among the smallest among the OECD coun-
tries—that is, on the same level as expected in the United States and much
lower than the expected increase in some of the countries in southern Eu-
rope and Japan. Based on the most recent projection of the population by
age, the share of people 65 and older relative to the number of people 20 to
64 years old is expected to go up from 24 percent currently to about 40 per-
cent 40 years from now (Statistics Denmark 2002, Economic Council
1998). This is not the ﬁrst jump in the share, as it went up from 13 percent
in the years immediately after World War II to 26 percent in 1990. This de-
velopment was, however, more easily absorbed by the economy. For one
thing, the initial burden of providing for the elderly was lower. Second, this
ﬁrst jump in the share was accompanied by a strong increase in female la-
bor force participation, to a level close to what is found for men. This, ob-
viously, cannot be repeated during the expected future jump in the share of
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Research Fund is gratefully acknowledged.people 65 years and older, as the current female labor force participation is
close to that of men.
The demographic change has been accompanied by a change in retire-
ment behavior, implying a signiﬁcant decrease in the actual average retire-
ment age. Comparing estimates from the mid-1970s to behavior in the late
1990s, before current reforms of the early retirement programs were en-
acted, the average retirement age for men has gone down from about 66
years to 61 to 62 years. For women, the average retirement age has gone
down by about one year since the late 1980s. Women retire on average ear-
lier than men, but the more moderate decline in the retirement age among
women reﬂects the net eﬀect of cohorts of married women with increasing
labor market participation along with a decrease in the average retirement
age (Economic Council 1998). Over this period, the oﬃcial retirement age,
deﬁned as the age at which individuals are entitled to National Old Age
Pension, has remained unchanged at 67 years. The decline in the actual av-
erage retirement age has occurred along with the introduction during the
last 23 years of new public-sector subsidized programs for early retirement.
At the same time, private pension plans and arrangements that typically
contain options for early retirement, beginning at age 60, have become rel-
evant for many people.
The projected changes in the age composition of the population along
with changes in retirement behavior have potentially large consequences
for public sector ﬁnances. In the Danish context, in a number of recent
studies the full impact on the tax-to-GNP ratio has been estimated to be
between 4 and 9 percent (Socialkommissionen 1993, Finansministeriet
1996, Finansrådet 1998, Economic Council 1998).
In this chapter, we quantify the impact of reforms to the social security
system on the government’s solvency situation for a particular cohort of
workers aged 50 in 1995. The set of reforms considered are selected mainly
for their comparability across OECD countries, and are not necessarily the
most desirable or politically feasible in the context of Denmark. Nonethe-
less, the exercise is expected to yield some useful insights into the net eﬀects
on the government budget of changing social security provisions. The set
of reforms we consider are compared to the system that was in place in
1995, the base year for our simulations, and include a mandatory increase
in program eligibility ages, a move to an actuarially fair system, and the im-
plementation of a simple uniﬁed system that is common across countries.
In the second section, we provide evidence on the decreased labor supply
activity among the elderly in Denmark by surveying the main trends in the
labor force participation of men and women over 45 years of age. We also
review the basic institutional elements of the Danish retirement system.
The Danish retirement system is a complex mix of pay-as-you-go-ﬁnanced
old-age pension, tax-ﬁnanced social disability pension, with eligibility de-
pending on a mix of health and social criteria, early retirement as part of
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private pension arrangements. We emphasize the retirement incentives in-
herent in this broad range of programs and consider their impacts on re-
tirement behavior. Finally, we review implications for the ﬁscal position of
the growing dependency burden. Section 3.3 presents the basic model used
for the simulations of the impact of reforms in retirement systems on the
net ﬁscal contribution of older workers. Section 3.4 describes the simula-
tion methodology and the particular issues that arise in its implementation
in the Danish case, section 3.5 presents the ﬁndings from the simulation ex-
ercise on the main ﬁscal impacts of proposed policy reforms, in terms of ex-
pected changes in the present discounted value of tax receipts and beneﬁt
payments, and section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Labor Supply of Older Workers and Retirement Systems in Denmark
3.2.1 Work Behavior of the Elderly
The very big changes in industrial structure along with changes in re-
tirement programs and pension options for diﬀerent groups have shaped
the long-term development in participation rates. Another factor with a
big impact, especially in the Nordic countries, has been the long-run trend
toward increasing labor force participation among married women.
Figure 3.1shows the trend in labor force participation since 1960 among
men older than 44 years. The observation for 1975 is the ﬁrst year with high
unemployment in the graph. The ﬁrst three observations refer to years of
full employment in a period of big structural changes. There was a large
move out of agriculture, implying a reduction in the share of self-employed
men in these age groups. People in independent business have always had
a relatively high retirement age, so this structural shift in the economy is
part of the explanation for the declining participation rates in the begin-
ning of the period covered in ﬁgure 3.1.
After 1975 there follows 20 years of high and mostly increasing unem-
ployment until the mid-1990s. The participation rates among men 45 to 59
years old decline further, reﬂecting, among other things, an easier entry to
Social Disability Pension (SDP) during a high unemployment period. It is
evident, however, that the really large changes occur in the age group 60
and older, and especially so among people in the ﬁrst half of their 60s. This
reﬂects primarily the introduction in 1979 of a labor-market-related pro-
gram for early retirement at the age of 60. The program, called the Post-
Employment Wage (PEW) was intended for unskilled workers with many
years of hard physical work behind them, but it turned out to become much
more broadly popular than initially expected. We return to the details of
the program in the following.
For women 45 years and older, ﬁgure 3.2 presents a quite diﬀerent pic-
Fiscal Implications of Reforms in Retirement Systems in Denmark 121ture. The diﬀerence obviously relates to the strong increase in labor market
participation among married women, which did not level out until the late
1980s.
The increase in participation in age groups up to 59 years until the mid-
1990s reﬂects cohort eﬀects. For those 60 years and older, the cohort eﬀects
are counteracted by the possibility of entry into the PEW program and
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Fig. 3.1 Participation rates for men 45 years and older, 1960–2000
Fig. 3.2 Participation rates for women 45 years and older, 1960–2000from extended possibilities to enter the SDP. The decline in participation
rates is much smaller among men, but note that the participation rate
among women 60 and older never reached near the initial level among men
in this age group. For people up to the age of about 50, ﬁgures 3.1 and 3.2
show, on the other hand, a near complete convergence between the partici-
pation rates for women and men from the mid-1980s.
For the year 2000, ﬁgures 3.3 and 3.4 further illustrate the distribution
of men and women according to a number of activities. For both women
and men there is a distinct kink in the share in employment from age 60,
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Fig. 3.3 The distribution of men on activities, 45–70 years, 2000
Fig. 3.4 The distribution of women on activities, 45–70 years, 2000when a major part of the labor force becomes eligible for PEW. A corre-
sponding decrease occurs in the share in unemployment from age 60. For
women, there is a stronger decline in the employment share from age 50 to
age 59 than among men. More women (52 and older) are in a temporary
beneﬁt program for early retirement, called the TBP program, which is de-
scribed later. More important is the fact that the share of women with SDP
in their late 50s is nearly double the level found among men. Fewer women
than men fulﬁll the eligibility criteria for PEW. As a reﬂection of this, we
note that the share of women with SDP at age 66, after which everyone be-
comes eligible to old age pension, is double the level found for men. From
age 67, old-age pension takes over as the dominant state. Still, however,
there is a gender diﬀerence here, as about 20 percent of the men still have a
market income as the dominant income source at age 70.
While ﬁgures 3.3 and 3.4 include individuals in the labor force and in re-
tirement programs, ﬁgures 3.5 and 3.6 concentrate on the distribution on
diﬀerent states of individuals outside the labor force between 45 and 67
years old.
Individuals in labor market programs and individuals on welfare bene-
ﬁts may return to the labor force. The other states included in ﬁgures 3.5
and 3.6 are approximately absorbing.
Most individuals outside the labor force have an income from a labor
market program, from welfare, or from one of the early retirement pro-
grams. The ages of eligibility are clearly visible; that is, in 2000 it was 53 for
the TBP program and 60 for the PEW program. In principle, people older
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Fig. 3.5 Distribution of women 45–67 years old outside the labor force on diﬀerent
states in 2000than 60 are not cut oﬀ from labor market programs or from being eligible
for welfare. In practice, however, ﬁgures 3.5 and 3.6 demonstrate that al-
ternative states become completely dominant from that age.
3.2.2 Retirement Programs in Denmark
By international comparison, the oﬃcial retirement age in Denmark is
high. Until 1998 it was, at 67, one of the highest in the OECD countries.
Along with a reform in 1999 of a major early retirement program, the PEW,
the oﬃcial pension age was reduced to 65 years, eﬀective from 2004.
The structure in the Danish pension and retirement system consists of a
number of public-sector programs and private arrangements. The major
public sector-ﬁnanced programs consist of the National Old Age Pension
(OAP, Folkepension), Social and Disability Pension (SDP, Førtidspension
[until 1984 Disability pension]), and pensions to certain groups of public
employees in permanent positions—the Public Employees Pension scheme
(PEP, Tjenestemandspension).
There are two important mixed public/private sector arrangements.
The biggest is a labor-market-related program open for people 60 to 66
years old, called the Post Employment Wage (PEW, Efterløn). Another is
the ATP program, to which employed persons and their employers, both
public and private, contribute.
Private-sector arrangements cover a broad range, from mature pension
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Fig. 3.6 Distribution of men 45–67 years old outside the labor force on diﬀerent
states in 2000funds, other funds in the blue collar part of the labor market still in a build-
up phase, and fully individual arrangements, of which most are tax subsi-
dized. We describe the diﬀerent programs brieﬂy in the following.1
3.2.3 National Old Age Pension (OAP, Folkepension)
The OAP is in principle a universal program in the sense that eligibility
depends only on age and on the duration of stay in Denmark. Thus, it is not
dependent on labor market experience or former earnings. Depending on
the level and the type of other income, a person is entitled from the age of
67 to a base amount and to pension supplements. The base amount is,
however, means tested against earnings from work. Until the 1999 reform,
the pension age was 67 years and the base amount was reduced, with 60
percent of eventual earnings from work in excess of an amount roughly
corresponding to earnings in a fulltime job during the whole year at the
minimum wage.2
The reduction of the oﬃcial pension age in 1999 from 67 to 65, eﬀective
from 2004, appears as slightly paradoxical in relation to current policy dis-
cussions in most OECD countries of increasing the retirement age. The in-
tention in the 1999 reform was, however, exactly to result in an increase in
the average actual retirement age (currently around 61.5 years) at the same
time as the oﬃcial pension age was reduced. It was part of a policy pack-
age primarily directed toward the PEW. We return to complete this picture
later. The reduction in the oﬃcial pension age regarding the OAP was
accompanied by more liberal rules regarding means testing of the base
pension amount against earnings from work. In the future, the reduction
percentage will be 30 percent of income from work in excess of annual
earnings, corresponding roughly to the average annual income from an un-
skilled job. The impact from this change on retirement behavior is diﬃcult
to estimate in isolation, as by now people who are still in the labor force
when they are 65 and older will typically have incomes well above the rele-
vant part of the income scale regarding means testing. The eventual impact
should be seen, however, in conjunction with the impact on retirement be-
havior and attitudes from changes in the PEW proposed in 1998 and en-
acted in 1999; see the following.
In addition to the base amount in the OAP, which as described is means
tested against income from work, there is a pension supplement that is
means tested against all other income, that is, also capital income. The
rules regarding means testing of the pension supplement were not changed
as part of the 1999 reform.
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1. A discussion of the ongoing policy reforms in this area can be found in OECD (2000).
2. Actually, this is a description of the rule until the mid-1990s. During the last few years,
until the 1998 reform, the free earnings maximum (the exemption) before reduction of the
base amount was gradually increased.3.2.4 Social Disability Pension (SDP, Førtidspension)
The main principles behind the rules for the SDP were enacted through
a major reform in 1984 of the public sector programs regarding early re-
tirement. The SDP was intended to replace a number of earlier programs.
The biggest among these was the disability pension, which could be
granted on three levels according to health criteria. Other programs, which
were included into the SDP, were a public-ﬁnanced program for widows’
pension and a program for early OAP for persons whose (older) spouses
were already receiving the OAP.
SDP on medical or social criteria can be granted on three levels. The
highest level is applicable to persons younger than 60 whose work capacity
has been (or always was) reduced to almost nothing. The intermediate-
level SDP is open for those younger than 60 with a work capacity reduced
to one-third of the normal level and to people 60 to 66 years old with al-
most no remaining work capacity. Eligibility for the highest and the inter-
mediate-level SDP is decided on medical criteria. Finally, eligibility for the
lowest level, the so-called ordinary-level SDP depends on work capacity
having been reduced to below half the normal level. The evaluation of this
is based on health criteria or on a combination of health and social crite-
ria. Recipients of the ordinary-level SDP who are younger than 60 are en-
titled to a supplementary amount. Granting of the ordinary-level pension
is dependent on rehabilitation having been considered or tried without
success.
In principle, award of SDP depends on an application being decided on
relative to a set of medical and social criteria. SDP is thus not an individ-
ual option like eligibility—for example, labor-market pension from a spe-
ciﬁc age. SDP consists of a number of components. Parallel to OAP, it in-
cludes a base amount and an additional pension amount. Furthermore,
SDP can include supplementary amounts, depending on the level of the
SDP that has been granted. A Work Inability Amount is granted to people
on the highest SDP level. People in that group, along with people granted
the intermediate-level SDP, receive further a Disability Amount, while—
as mentioned earlier—persons younger than 60 granted the ordinary-level
SDP receive a supplementary, so-called Compensating Amount. The SDP
system is quite complex, as the rules diﬀer regarding tax treatment and re-
garding means testing of the diﬀerent components and amounts. In 2003 a
reform was enacted that made the program simpler.
3.2.5 Post-Employment Wage (PEW, Efterløn)
In contrast to the SDP the PEW scheme, introduced in 1979, provides
the possibility of early retirement without having to fulﬁll any health crite-
ria. It was intended to be a labor-market policy instrument with the pur-
pose of creating jobs for young people by reducing the retirement age for
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unemployment. To be eligible, a person must be between sixty and sixty-
six years, have been a member of an unemployment insurance (UI) fund
for 20 of the previous twenty-ﬁve years, and be eligible for UI beneﬁts. If a
person enters directly from a job, beneﬁts in the PEW system are equal to
the amounts to which she or he would be entitled in case of unemployment.
This is for a maximum of 2.5 years, after which period beneﬁts in the pro-
gram are reduced to 82 percent of the UI beneﬁts until reaching eligibility
for the OAP. The only diﬀerence in the situation for a person who is enter-
ing PEW from unemployment is a reduction of the period with full UI ben-
eﬁts by the length of the spell of unemployment, which became terminated
by entry into the program. Participants in the program are only allowed
paid work up to a maximum of 200 hours per year. The beneﬁts in the PEW
program are not means tested against the income of other family members,
but income from pension schemes from previous employers are deducted
from the PEW beneﬁts. The SDP cannot be collected at the same time as
PEW. Finally, it should be mentioned that the PEW was introduced as a no-
regret system, in the sense that a participant returning to the labor force
could not reenter PEW at a later date.
In 1999 a fairly complicated reform of the PEW was enacted. In the fol-
lowing we describe the main features of this reform. A number of transi-
tory arrangements are not covered. The age of eligibility is still at 60, but
incentives were introduced to postpone entry until the age of 62 or later. At
the same time, as part of the reform, the eligibility age for the old-age pen-
sion was reduced from 67 to 65. To become eligible for PEW after the re-
form, an individual is required to have been in an unemployment insurance
fund for 25 out of the last 30 years, and to have paid an early retirement
beneﬁt contribution during this period.
If PEW is entered before the age of 62, beneﬁts are reduced not only
against actual income from other pension schemes but also against an ac-
tuarial calculation of the current value of the income stream from private
pensions, which are postponed. Before age 62 beneﬁts are 91 percent of the
maximum unemployment beneﬁts.
Entry from age 62 results in higher beneﬁts and more favorable rules re-
garding means testing against other pension incomes. Furthermore, post-
poning retirement for two years or more from age 62 implies a tax discount
maximized at a little above 100,000 Danish Kroner (13,800 €). Finally, the
rules have been changed, making it more attractive to continue working at
the same time as collecting PEW. The reform has so far resulted in a decline
in the takeup of PEW for those 60 to 61 years old (see Economic Council
2002). The initial impact on retirement is analyzed using microdata by
Danø, Ejrnaes, and Husted (2000) and Quaade (2001). The impact from a
minor reform in 1992 is analyzed in Larsen (2005).
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This program was introduced in 1992. Eligible persons for entry were
initially 55- to 59-year-old members of unemployment insurance funds
who had been unemployed for at least 12 out of the most recent 15 months.
Beneﬁts were set at 82 percent of maximum unemployment insurance ben-
eﬁts and the maximum duration was until transition to PEW at the age of
60. From the beginning of 1994 the program was extended to cover the age
group 50 to 54 years, with the same labor market criteria as for the 55- to
59-year-old group. Entry to the program was terminated at the beginning
of 1996. Entry to the program surpassed projections, as was also the case
when the PEW was introduced, in 1979.
3.2.7 Public Employees Pension Scheme (PEP; Tjenestemandspension)
The PEP is a program covering many employees in the public sector. The
pension is considered to be part of a lifetime wage contract, and conse-
quently is unfunded. The pension amount is calculated as a function of the
wage, depending on seniority and position.
3.2.8 Labor-Market Pensions (LMP)
There is a wide and expanding coverage of LMP programs. The building
up of pension funds began some 40 years ago for fairly small, highly edu-
cated groups. Coverage has since broadened; during the last decade a ma-
jor part of the labor market for blue collar workers has also been covered
with pension plans. Typically, the pension funds build on deﬁned contri-
butions of either 15 percent (high-wage groups) or 9 percent (industrial
workers) of their annual earnings.
3.2.9 Other Programs
The General Labour Market Pension (ATP) is a small, supplementary
program to OAP. It was introduced in 1964 and is being funded by contri-
butions, which depend on hours of work. Finally, there is a broad coverage
with private pension plans, mostly into some broad categories of savings
arrangement, which until recently have been treated quite favorably by the
tax rules.
3.2.10 Fiscal Implications of the Growing Dependency Burden
As reported in section 3.1, in the coming years the dependency ratio in
Denmark is expected to go from the current four persons in the active age
group per senior citizen (65 or over), to about 2.5 in 2040. Further, the
proportion of very old persons (80 years and above) is expected to double
in the years to come, from its current 5 percent of the working-age popu-
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the economic implications of the growing number of senior citizens, using
a general equilibrium model. The ﬁndings show that expenditures on
public pensions, nursing homes, and so on are expected to increase con-
siderably. The decrease in the labor force will aﬀect production and de-
crease the tax base. However, at the same time, tax revenue will increase
due to greater taxable income being paid out from labor market and
private pension schemes. Projections show that overall taxes must in-
crease by 9.4 percent of GDP for the period 2005 to 2035. Other studies
(Socialkommissionen [1993], Finansministeriet [1996], Finansrådet
[1998]), ﬁnd signiﬁcantly lower increases in the tax/GDP ratio; that is, be-
tween 4 and 6 percentage points. While the calculations in the Economic
Council (1998) take into account the changing demographic proﬁle of fu-
ture generations, and the growing importance of labor market pension
schemes in future pensioners’ income, no attempt is made to model re-
tirement behavior, and all persons are assumed to leave the labor market
at the age of 62 and to receive PEW income until the age of 67, when they
start to receive old-age pension and income from pension funds. The most
recent projection is made by the Velfaerdskommissionen (Welfare Com-
mission [2004]), illustrating the importance of the assumptions regarding
expected lifetime in the future. The base projection, assuming an expected
lifetime increase, in accordance with the experience in recent decades and
assuming no behavioral changes, results in a necessary increase in the ba-
sic income tax of 8.7 percentage points for ﬁscal policy to be long-run sus-
tainable. Assuming instead, unrealistically, that no further increase oc-
curs in expected lifetime, the necessary increase in the tax rate is only 1.6
percentage points.
In contrast, the approach taken here is to use the predictions arising out
of a behavioral model of the retirement decision in which workers make
forward-looking comparisons of the advantages of retirement at alterna-
tive ages in the future to the value of present retirement and update that
information as they age. These predictions are then used to simulate the
eﬀects of strategic reforms of the pension system on the net ﬁscal contri-
bution of older workers to retirement income ﬁnances. Of course, the anal-
ysis is limited to the implications of reform for a given (recent) cohort of
older persons, and the given structure of the Danish pension and retire-
ment system, in which old-age pensions from the government are the pri-
mary source of income for pensioners. In the future, most pensioners are
expected to receive the greater part of their income from labor-market pen-
sion schemes. This will imply both higher mean income and a greater ex-
pected level of income dispersion among future pensioners. The Economic
Council’s (1998) calculations suggest that the median income of future
pensioners will be around 40 percent higher than the income of today’s
pensioners. At the same time, however, a relatively large group of future
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income level as today’s pensioners. Those pensioners who were employed
full-time throughout their careers are expected to make up the higher end
of the income distribution, while people who were periodically unem-
ployed or held part-time employment during their working life will consti-
tute the middle of the income distribution, and those with only a loose at-
tachment to the labor market will make up the lower end of the retirement
income distribution.
With this background of the Danish pension and retirement system in
mind, we turn in the next section to the exercise in which we focus on the
retirement decisions of a recent cohort of older workers, simulate the
eﬀects of changes in plan provisions on the retirement decisions of these
workers, and then track how changes in retirement patterns aﬀect the ﬁs-
cal balance sheet of retirement income for the current generation of older
workers.
3.3 The Base Model for the Simulations
The data set used in the analysis is a 2 percent sample drawn from the
Integrated Database for Labour Market Research (IDA), which covers
the population of residents of Denmark. All information in the IDA data,
which is compiled and made available by Statistics Denmark, is based on
administrative registers and therefore has no survey component to it. We
focus on a single-year birth cohort, that is, the 1945 birth cohort that is ob-
served to be aged 50 in 1995, thereby controlling for both time and age
eﬀects in the analysis. Although early retirement eligibility begins ﬁrst at
age 60, we start our analysis at 50, as this is the age at which public or
private retirement income for disability or illness can ﬁrst be expected for
those in the labor market. We condition on labor force attachment before
50, as most of the population in Denmark is employed at that age. Our
sample sizes for the simulations are 1,533 individual workers. Each of the
workers of age 50 in our sample represents 50 workers in the population of
public and private sector workers born in 1945.
For each of the workers at age 50, we predict earnings forward for each
year until age 70. Age 70 is the age at which all workers still in the labor
force are assumed to exit the labor force permanently through retirement.
On the basis of predicted earnings, we can then project each worker’s social
security wealth (SSW) at each possible future retirement age until age 100.
As exit from the labor force can also occur through death, we account for
mortality by applying the probability of dying taken from the age-gender
life tables in 1995 for the total population. Workers in our sample can exit
the data either through retirement, death, or attrition. We can identify
when the ﬁrst two types of exits occur, but cannot identify the reason be-
hind the third type of exit (i.e., death or out-migration). Therefore, we use
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for death. In equation form, we have, then:
prob(exit)   prob(death)   prob(retirement)
As our overall goal is to simulate the impact of reforms to retirement sys-
tems on the retirement behavior of older workers, and then to calculate the
eﬀects of changed labor supply behavior on the net contribution of older
workers to retirement income ﬁnances, we start by presenting our esti-
mates from an option value behavioral model of retirement, in which
workers make forward-looking comparisons of the advantages of retire-
ment at alternative ages in the future to the value of present retirement and
update that information as they age (see Gruber and Wise [2004] for details
on that model).
The option value model was operationalized by a simple probability
model of retirement (for example, probit):
Prob(retire in year t)   Pr[    Gt(r∗)    Xt   εt   0],
in which the dependent variable is binary and takes the value 1 if retired,
0 if not, and where G( ) is the option value of postponing retirement (in
other cases, the peak value or the accrual measure) calculated under the
assumed parameter values, and X is a vector of additional variables, in-
cluding SSW.
In tables 3.1 and 3.2, we present model estimates of   and the coeﬃcient
of SSW (included in X) for samples of male and female older workers
drawn from the IDA. Each regression is run in two ways, with age entered
either linearly or captured by a full set of dummies, for each of the three in-
centive measures mentioned earlier, accrual (one-year change in SSW),
peak value (the ﬁnancial option value) and option value.
Model estimates from the sample of males are shown in table 3.1. The
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Table 3.1 Estimates from the retirement probit—males sample
Accrual incentive Peak value incentive Option value incentive
Linear age Age dummies Linear age Age dummies Linear age Age dummies
SSW 0.0023437 0.0000568 0.0021998 0.0009605 0.0020257 0.0009254
(0.000122) (0.0001361) (0.0001238) (0.0001306) (0.0001252) (0.0001325)
0.001838 4.12E-06 0.0001363 0.000075 0.0001235 0.0000716
Incentive 0.0036759 –0.0355246 –0.0159361 –0.0050171 –0.0112939 –0.0041719
measure (0.000608) (0.0008928) (0.0002211) (0.000312) (0.0001574) (0.0002204)
0.0002882 –0.0025742 –0.0009874 –0.0003915 –0.0006887 –0.0003228
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.3658 0.3104 0.321 0.3117 0.3217
Log likelihood –44,879.02 –40,085.73 –44,763.012 –44,077.778 –43,327.098 –42,699.919
Note: For each incentive measure, we report the estimated coeﬃcient, its estimated standard error in parentheses, and
the marginal eﬀect in bold.level of SSW, which captures the wealth eﬀects of retirement income, sig-
niﬁcantly positively aﬀects the retirement probability, while in all but one
case (accrual-linear age), the relevant incentive measure that measures the
incentive to continue working signiﬁcantly negatively aﬀects the odds of
retiring. In general, the age dummy speciﬁcation ﬁts the data a little better
than the speciﬁcation in which age is entered linearly. Speciﬁcations that
employ forward-looking incentive measures (peak value and option value)
ﬁt the data better than using the one-year accrual incentive measure. Thus,
observed retirement behavior is better explained by incentive measures
that take into account the potential future beneﬁts of continuing work.
Similar results are obtained for the sample of females (not shown here).
Based on these model estimates, we map each worker’s actual character-
istics into a probability of retirement. Then, we simulate the impacts of
three strategic reforms of the retirement system on the predicted probabil-
ities of retirement. The ﬁrst, the Three-Year Reform, involves a three-year
delay in the early and normal ages of retirement. Thus, the age of ﬁrst eli-
gibility of postemployment wage (PEW) and early retirement through the
Public Employee’s Pension (PEP) is increased by three years (from 60 to
63), and the age of ﬁrst eligibility of Transitional Beneﬁt Program UI
(TBP) is also delayed by three years, from 55 to 58. The normal old-age
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Table 3.2 Average retirement ages in simulations—males and females
Simulated reform
Three-Year Diﬀerence Common Diﬀerence
Baseline Reform from baseline Reform from baseline
Males
Accrual—S1 60.44432 60.28469 –0.15963 60.38432 –0.06000
Accrual—S2 60.27340 60.64349  0.37009 60.95542  0.68202
Accrual—S3 60.27340 62.28802  2.01462 59.60625 –0.66715
Peak value—S1 60.76490 62.12958  1.36468 61.18836  0.42346
Peak value—S2 60.68337 61.23892  0.55555 61.08496  0.40159
Peak value—S3 60.68337 62.57302  1.88965 60.09098 –0.59239
Option value—S1 60.77458 62.16372  1.38914 61.23221  0.45763
Option value—S2 60.69852 61.32813  0.62961 61.13278  0.43426
Option value—S3 60.69852 62.59626  1.89774 60.14049 –0.55803
Females
Accrual—S1 60.44432 60.28469 –0.15963 60.38432 –0.06000
Accrual—S2 60.27340 60.64349  0.37009 60.95542  0.68202
Accrual—S3 60.27340 62.28802  2.01462 59.60625 –0.66715
Peak value—S1 60.76490 62.12958  1.36468 61.18836  0.42346
Peak value—S2 60.68337 61.23892  0.55555 61.08496  0.40159
Peak value—S3 60.68337 62.57302  1.88965 60.09098 –0.59239
Option value—S1 60.77458 62.16372  1.38914 61.23221  0.45763
Option value—S2 60.69852 61.32813  0.62961 61.13278  0.43426
Option value—S3 60.69852 62.59626  1.89774 60.14049 –0.55803pension (OAP) retirement age is increased by three years. The age-gender-
speciﬁc probability of disability for those aged 60 to 62 is assumed to be
that probability observed in the data at age 59, and for those aged 63 to 70
the age-gender-speciﬁc probabilities are those observed in the data for in-
dividuals three years younger.3
The second, the Common Reform, is intended to apply a uniﬁed system
in each country, in which the early retirement age is set at 60, the normal
retirement age at 65, and in which beneﬁts are set equal to 60 percent of
(capped) lifetime earnings and are reduced actuarially 6 percent per year if
taken before 65, and increased actuarially 6 percent per year if taken after
65. No other retirement program is assumed to be in eﬀect alongside.
The third reform, the Actuarial Reform, implies a move to an actuarially
fair system without changing the early or normal retirement ages or the re-
placement rate and without removing coexisting means-tested programs
such as disability or public employers’ pension. Thus, this reform is a com-
promise between the Three-Year Reform and the Common Reform and
should thereby be useful in understanding the full impact of the Common
Reform. Under this reform, the beneﬁt at NRA is kept at its existing level
and adjusted 6 percent per year actuarially away from this level, as in the
common case.
In each case, we specify a model with age-speciﬁc dummy variables, do-
ing the simulation in each of three ways: S1 is the simulation method in
which a linear-age term is included in the estimation only; S2 is the simu-
lation method in which the age dummies are included in the estimation but
not in the simulation, and S3 is the simulation method in which age indi-
cators are both used in the estimation, and the estimated coeﬃcients on
these indicators are used to simulate retirement under program changes.
The resulting baseline and simulated average retirement ages in the Danish
case are presented in table 3.2.
Average retirement ages for the male sample in table 3.2 show that the
three-year eligibility delay under the Three-Year Reform increases the av-
erage age of retirement by nearly two years in Denmark for all incentive
measures using S3 assumptions. Comparing across simulation methods
S1, S2, and S3, we ﬁnd that in general (except for the accrual case), the in-
crease in the average retirement age is greatest under S3 and smallest un-
der S2, while S1 falls in the middle. It is to be expected that S3 will predict
later retirement than S2 and S1, as S3 includes both age-indicator eﬀects
and program incentive eﬀects. For the Common Reform, in the Danish
case the average retirement age is lowered under S3 assumptions, most
likely due to the relative generosity of the Common Reform compared to
the existing system. Again, S3 predicts a bigger decrease in the retirement
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3. At the same time, we adjust the age at which the supplement for delayed retirement to
PEW is eﬀective from 63 to 66.age than S2 and S1 for the reasons stated previously. Findings for females
are nearly the same as seen in the bottom rows of table 3.2.
3.4 Simulation Methodology
Based on the predicted retirement rates generated under the current sys-
tem and under each reform, our goal is to compute the associated tax rev-
enue and beneﬁt payments corresponding to the retirement patterns under
the baseline, and then compare that to the projected tax revenue and ben-
eﬁt expenditure for each hypothetical change in plan provision. Thus, the
key policy parameter will be the percentage change in the net cost of the re-
tirement program for a representative individual (aged 50 in 1995) drawn
from our sample of workers.
Note that in the implementation of this exercise, we do not use actual
data for the workers in our sample, because this is the only way we can ob-
tain a clean comparison of the expected outcome under the current system
and the expected outcome under a change in pension plan provision. We
merely take our sample of workers and apply to them the estimated retire-
ment probabilities generated from our option value analysis, and use these
as the starting point for producing a time series that tracks the evolution of
this cohort of workers between age 50 and 100, the assumed date of death
of the last remaining individual in the sample. Note that we do not keep
track of survivors or dependents in the analysis. This is because the Dan-
ish retirement income and taxation calculation is purely individual based,
so that accounting for dependents’ and survivors’ income is not a relevant
issue.4
The presence of multiple retirement programs in the Danish context,
however, introduces some complexity, which is solved by assuming that
individuals take the most ﬁnancially lucrative path by constructing a
weighted incentive measure, in which the weights are the probabilities that
the person is eligible for each program.5 When simulating the reforms, the
issue of eligibility to programs such as unemployment and disability needs
to be addressed. While we increase all other eligibility ages (PEW, OAP,
PEP, and TBP) by three years under the ﬁrst reform, as disability beneﬁts
are available at every age in Denmark, we adjust the age-gender-speciﬁc
probabilities of disability receipt so that they are the same as the observed
probabilities of individuals three years younger. In the case of the Actuar-
ial Reform, we retain the probabilities of disability receipt at each age but
Fiscal Implications of Reforms in Retirement Systems in Denmark 135
4. The only element of joint taxation present in the Danish tax system is in the treatment of
capital income, for which data is not available. Other than that, we account for allowances
that vary by marital status, but do not need to use actual spousal income for computing indi-
vidual tax or beneﬁt amounts.
5. A more detailed description of the algorithm used to construct this weighted-average
SSW can be found in the appendix to the introduction in Gruber and Wise (2004).adjust the disability beneﬁt 6 percent per year actuarially away from the
NRA (67). In the Common Reform, we eliminate access to any other (in-
cluding disability) programs.
The focus of the analysis will be to distinguish the eﬀects on ﬁscal bal-
ances of the labor-supply response to the reform, which we label ﬁscal im-
plications of behavioral eﬀect, from the eﬀects on ﬁscal balances that arise
purely out of a change of beneﬁt entitlements, holding constant any labor-
supply response, which we term the mechanical eﬀect. The total ﬁscal im-
pact is then the sum of both eﬀects. That is, if idenotes individual and sde-
notes state (exit to death or retirement at each age) and B is base and R is
reform,





























































Note that in our case, potential retirement ages go from 50 to 69, giving
2   20   40 possible states.
3.5 Results
The expected present discounted value (PDV) of tax payments and ben-
eﬁt payments for our sample of workers is computed from age 50 to age
100.6 Results are based on the forward-looking incentive measures only
(peak and option value) in this study, although in Gruber and Wise (2004),
a set of results for one-year accrual in SSW were also generated. For most
countries, it was found that accrual and peak value produced similar re-
sults. Also, in this study, we mainly discuss the ﬁndings arising out of the
two simulation methodologies S1 (linear age) and S3 (age dummies in-
cluded in the model and shifted in the simulation), although results for S2
are presented in the tables. These results appear in appendix ﬁgures 3A.1
to 3A.8, ﬁgure 3.7, and tables 3.3 and 3.4.
Consider ﬁrst the set of ﬁgures labeled ﬁgure 3A.1, panels A–C (S1OV),
which describe the option value, linear age speciﬁcation results under the
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6. All pension ﬂows and tax payments are discounted back to age 50 by a 3 percent real rate
of interest.Fig. 3.7 A, Fiscal impact of Three-Year Reform; B, Fiscal impact of Actuarial
Reform; C, Fiscal impact of Common Reform
A
B
Cthree reforms. From ﬁgure 3A.1, panel A (S1OV), it appears that the gross
SSW proﬁle changes little under the Three-Year Reform, as entitlements
do not change, only the age at which they can be ﬁrst received. In ﬁgure
3A.1, panel B (S1OV), for the Actuarial Reform, note that gross SSW
peaks at age 60 (age of ﬁrst eligibility of early retirement) under the base-
line and declines thereafter, though ﬂattening out from age 66 and over.
The decline in gross SSW under the baseline clearly reﬂects the actuarial
unfairness of the beneﬁts system, as gains in earnings from postponing re-
tirement are largely oﬀset by losses in future social security beneﬁts. Gross
SSW is considerably lowered for all ages up to 64 under the Actuarial Re-
form, and is higher thereafter compared to the baseline. Thus, the reform
is more actuarially fair than the existing system at older ages. Gross SSW is
particularly lowered at early retirement ages, both by the low level of ben-
eﬁts away from the NRA of 67, which are in turn weighted by the (low)
probability of disability receipt at these ages. A similar proﬁle to gross SSW
is generated under the Common Reform, although beneﬁts are not penal-
ized nearly as much if retirement is taken early, because the NRA is now
brought forward to 65 and access to disability is removed. Figure 3A.2,
panels A–C (S1OV) present the PDV of tax collections under the baseline
and for each of the three reforms. As evidenced in these ﬁgures, the PDV of
tax is close to the baseline in the case of the Three-Year Reform, and
slightly lowered in the 56 to 63 age group compared to baseline and higher
than baseline in the 67-and-up age group in the case of the other two re-
forms. This would indicate that as the two latter reforms essentially make
early retirement much less generous at early ages, less is collected by way of
taxes on beneﬁts. By the same argument, more would be collected at higher
ages relative to baseline because the beneﬁt proﬁle becomes more actuari-
ally fair. Of course, if retirement is delayed, people work longer and thereby
pay taxes on income (although wages are not high on average for elderly
workers), but as we shall see later, behavioral responses are relatively
smaller in the Danish case, so changes to the tax proﬁle are also dominated
by changes in entitlements. From ﬁgure 3A.3, panel A (S1OV), there is no
appreciable change in the postreform retirement hazard in the Three-Year
Reform case, largely because the linear age speciﬁcation fails to adequately
capture the full behavioral eﬀects of the change in the age of eligibility in-
duced by the reform and because of the adjustment made to the age-
gender-speciﬁc probabilities of disability, in which workers have the option
of going on disability-based retirement even when all other programs’ eli-
gibility ages are shifted three years. In the case of the two other reforms, ﬁg-
ures 3A.3, panels B–C, there appear to be signiﬁcant delaying eﬀects of re-
tirement until the age of 60 as compared to the baseline, with the retirement
hazard now peaking between 62 and 64 instead of between 60 and 62. This
occurs also in the case of the Common Reform where the NRA is brought
forward to 65, indicating the importance of early retirement in Denmark.
138 Paul Bingley, Nabanita Datta Gupta, and Peder J. PedersenThe next ﬁgure, ﬁgure 3A.4, panels A–C (S1OV), shows the total ﬁscal
eﬀect (gross and net) by age of labor force exit under the three reforms. The
total eﬀect is the sum of the mechanical and the behavioral eﬀect and mea-
sures the reform SSW minus the base SSW. The gross total ﬁscal eﬀect is
positive and increasing up to 65 (the maximum about 9,000 euros per per-
son) and declining thereafter (but still positive), under the Three-Year Re-
form. This reﬂects, (compare ﬁgure 3.2) that net SSW is higher at ages 60
and up compared to the baseline, because of the fact that by delaying eli-
gibility to retirement programs by 3 years, the government is forced to pay
out more to the (costly) disability program instead as disability continues
to be available up to 63 now (previously only up to 60). The net eﬀect is
somewhat mitigated by increased collection of taxes on disability beneﬁts
and work for those who delay retirement. The gross total eﬀect of the Ac-
tuarial Reform, ﬁgure 3A.4, panel B is considerably negative between ages
50 and 65 (nearly 80,000 euros per person in this age range) and moderately
positive thereafter (20,000 euros). The considerable savings in the 50 to 65
age range are due to the removal of the costly PEW program, which oﬀers
a high replacement rate to those who take it up (skilled, blue collar work-
ers), and therefore removing this program constitutes a considerable ﬁscal
saving for the government. Plus, although disability is available in prin-
ciple, the low probability of takeup in this age interval combined with the
low earnings (age 67 NRA beneﬁts actuarially adjusted at 6 percent per
year) if disabled represents a big saving compared to the previous disabil-
ity beneﬁts paid out. Nearly the same gross total eﬀect is seen in the case of
the Common Reform, in ﬁgure 3A.4, panel C, except that the gains in the
50 to 65 age group are a bit less than half (30–35,000 Euros per person) of
what they were under the Actuarial Reform. This is because access to dis-
ability is now removed, and instead people are paid the full actuarially ad-
justed retirement beneﬁt for early retirement rather than a small fraction
of it, depending on probability of disability. On the other hand, by bring-
ing the NRA forward to 65 (from 67), more is paid out by way of normal
retirement. However, the ﬁrst eﬀect still dominates, so that the net eﬀect is
still a total saving, despite the replacement rate under the Common Re-
form being more generous than the existing old-age pension system.
How do these results change when we change the way age is speciﬁed in
the model? We expect larger ﬁscal implications of the behavioral eﬀects,
particularly in the Three-Year Reform, because the age dummies were
highly signiﬁcant in the Danish case. Figure A.5, panels A–C (S3OV) ex-
amines the impact of each reform on baseline SSW under S3 assumptions
for the option value incentive measure. Looking ﬁrst at the Three-Year Re-
form, ﬁgure A.5, panel A in contrast to the linear speciﬁcation, gross SSW
increases over the baseline at all retirement ages, but particularly in the 54
to 62 interval, indicating the move to disability for those no longer entitled
to PEW at age 60. Gross SSW in the Actuarial Reform and Common
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tions. In ﬁgure 3A.6, panels A–C (S3OV), the PV of taxes also display non-
monotonicities and diﬀer more from the baseline now, with the PV of tax
collection peaking at 60 and 67 under the baseline, and now peaking at 68
as workers are induced to stay longer in the labor market under the Three-
Year Reform (ﬁgure 3A.6, panel A). In both the Actuarial and Common
case, ﬁgure 3A.6, panels B–C, the tax proﬁle becomes much more nonmo-
notonic and concentrated around 67 indicating the higher taxes on earnings
and consumption of those who are induced to continue working at older
ages. In ﬁgure 3A.7, panel A (S3OV), Three-Year Reform, retirement haz-
ards are no longer smooth functions of age (which they are by deﬁnition un-
der S1) but show spikes at ages 60, 62, and 68 under the baseline, age 60 be-
ing the age of ﬁrst eligibility of PEW, and age 62 possibly indicating the
actuarial adjustment eﬀect present in PEW if taken at 62 instead of 60 and
the peak at 68 representing the mass of retirement that takes place around
the age of ﬁrst eligibility of the old-age pension, which is 67. The eﬀect of the
reform is a clear move to the right of the retirement hazard, so that the spikes
now appear between 64 and 68, representing the behavioral response to the
reform, which the S1 method failed to capture. The behavioral response is
more moderate in the actuarial case, ﬁgure 3A.7, panel B, although there is
evidence of delayed retirement, with spikes at 62 and 68 being more pro-
nounced and less at earlier ages. In ﬁgure 3A.7, panel C (S3OV), the Com-
mon Reform redistributes the mass at 68 by inducing retirement to take
place between 62 and 65, more clearly evidenced under S3 assumptions.
This indicates that when age dummies are introduced in the analysis,
they clearly reﬂect the eﬀect that people retire earlier (from 67 to 65) under
the Common Reform, and this produces much larger ﬁscal implications of
the behavioral eﬀect in this age range.
In ﬁgure 3A.8, panels A–C (S3OV), the total eﬀect (gross and net) of the
reforms is largely the same under S1 and S3 for the Actuarial and Common
Reforms. However, a big change is seen for the Three-Year Reform, in
which the total eﬀect is now (in both gross and net terms) considerably
larger and nonmonotonic. The proﬁle also peaks at 57 now instead of at 66.
However, the total eﬀect is still positive for this reform, even though the la-
bor supply response was to delay retirement. The explanation must there-
fore lie in the alternative available to workers in the 60 to 62 age group,
which is the expensive disability option.
Figure 3.7, panels A–C, summarizes the previous observations, by pre-
senting both the behavioral eﬀect and the mechanical eﬀect together on the
same diagram, for each reform, for each type of assumption (S1, S2, S3),
and for each incentive measure (peak and option value).
In each case, as peak and option value results are nearly identical, only
the option value results are discussed. For the Three-Year Reform, both
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eﬀects are relatively larger, except under S3 assumptions, where both are
roughly of the same magnitude. Both type of eﬀects are, however, relatively
small (less than 0.015 percent of GDP). In the actuarial case, in ﬁgure 3.7,
panel B, mechanical eﬀects are negative and relatively stronger than under
the Three-Year Reform case (–0.1 percent of GDP). Behavioral eﬀects are
positive but small, so that the total eﬀect is still a savings to the government
of about 0.1 percent of GDP, which is not insigniﬁcant. That is, under the
Actuarial Reform, it is largely changes in program rules that determine the
overall ﬁscal picture, and the overall eﬀect is a reduction in net SSW. In 
the case of the Common Reform (ﬁgure 3.7, panel C), both mechanical and
behavioral eﬀects are negative and reinforce each other, representing over-
all ﬁscal savings, particularly in the case of S3, to the tune of –0.06 percent
of GDP. Thus, the biggest savings come from the Actuarial Reform, while
the Three-Year Reform actually decreases the ﬁscal budget.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 break out the ﬁscal impacts on the government bud-
get of these three reforms into the eﬀect on beneﬁts and the eﬀect on in-
come and value added taxes, on average, for our sample.7 Table 3.3 is in
terms of levels of PDV, while table 3.4 in changes in the PDV. The mone-
tary units are 2001 Euros. The numbers in the tables refer to an average per
person. The results presented in these tables summarize and reinforce the
ﬁgures. In table 3.3, option value S3 (the model that produced the best ﬁt
in the Danish case), the Three-Year Reform produces an average increase
of beneﬁts by 12.9 percent relative to baseline, while the Actuarial and
Common Reform generate a beneﬁts savings of 21 percent and 16 percent,
respectively. After-tax income goes up 1.1 percent in the ﬁrst case, and goes
down 7.1 percent and 6 percent in the latter two reforms. The total tax col-
lection, however, increases by 7.6 percent in the Three-Year Reform case
and decreases between 0.9–2.7 percent in the other two cases. Thus, the
Actuarial and Common Reforms produce a real savings for the govern-
ment, despite the small drop in taxes. Looking at table 3.4, the row of in-
terest is the “Change as a percent of base beneﬁts,” which shows that the
change in PDV relative to base is greatest in the actuarial case, a drop of al-
most 20 percent in S2 and S3 assumptions and 17 percent in S1. The drop
in the common program is about 7–13 percent. In the Three-Year Reform
case, the increase is from 3–5 percent. Mechanical eﬀects are relatively
much larger in the Actuarial and Common Reforms, almost all the savings
arising from changes in program rules, while in the Three-Year Reform,
mechanical and behavioral eﬀects are roughly of the same magnitude.
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7. In the Danish case, retirement beneﬁts are ﬁnanced through overall taxes, not through a
system of payroll taxes. The VAT factor   0.3 and is derived from the national estimates of
VAT taxes and speciﬁc taxes on goods over private consumption, 2002 data.Table 3.3 Total ﬁscal impact of reform (VAT factor   0.301803)
Present discounted value Total change relative to base (%)
Three-Year Actuarial Common Three-Year Actuarial Common
Base Reform Reform Reform Reform Reform Reform
Option value—S1
Beneﬁts 136 143 114 125 5.3 –16.4 –8.1
After-tax income 233 238 226 233 1.8 –3.3 –0.3
Taxes
Payroll 0 0 0 0
Income 85 86 88 84 1.1 3.3 –1.7
VAT 70 72 68 70 1.8 –3.3 –0.3
Total 156 158 156 154 1.4 0.3 –1.1
Option value—S2
Beneﬁts 138 145 110 125 4.7 –20.7 –9.7
After-tax income 220 224 205 217 1.7 –7.1 –1.3
Taxes
Payroll 0 0 0 0
Income 80 81 83 78 1.5 4.3 –2.7
VAT 66 68 62 66 1.7 –7.1 –1.3
Total 146 149 145 143 1.6 –0.9 –2.1
Option value—S3
Beneﬁts 138 156 110 116 12.9 –20.7 –15.9
After-tax income 220 223 205 207 1.1 –7.1 –6.0
Taxes
Payroll 0 0 0 0
Income 80 90 83 80 13.0 4.3 0.0
VAT 66 67 62 62 1.1 –7.1 –6.0
Total 146 158 145 142 7.6 –0.9 –2.7
Peak value—S1
Beneﬁts 136 143 114 124 5.3 –1.64 –8.9
After-tax income 234 238 225 231 1.8 –3.5 –0.9
Taxes
Payroll 0 0 0 0
Income 85 86 88 84 1.1 3.2 –2.2
VAT 70 72 68 70 1.8 –3.5 –0.9
Total 156 158 156 153 1.4 0.2 –1.6
Peak value—S2
Beneﬁts 138 145 109 125 4.6 –20.8 –9.6
After-tax income 220 224 204 217 1.7 –7.5 –1.4
Taxes
Payroll 0 0 0 0
Income 80 81 83 78 1.5 4.0 –2.8
VAT 66 68 61 65 1.7 –7.5 –1.4
Total 146 149 145 143 1.6 –1.2 –2.2
Peak value—S3
Beneﬁts 138 156 109 117 13.0 –20.8 –15.2
After-tax income 220 223 204 201 1.1 –7.5 –8.7
Taxes
Payroll 0 0 0 0
Income 80 90 83 80 13.0 4.0 0.5
VAT 66 67 61 61 1.1 –7.5 –8.7
Total 146 158 145 141 7.6 –1.2 –3.7Table 3.4 Decomposition of the total eﬀect of reform
Change in present discounted value
Three-Year Reform Actuarial Reform Common Reform
Mechanical Behavioral Total Mechanical Behavioral Total Mechanical Behavioral Total
Option value—S1
Beneﬁts 6 1 7 –29 7 –22 –12 1 –11
After-tax income 5 –1 4 –29 22 –8 –8 7 –1
Taxes
Payroll 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Income 1 0 1 0 3 3 –4 2 –1
VAT 1 0 1 –9 7 –2 –2 2 0
Total 3 0 2 –9 9 0 –6 5 –2
Net change 3 2 5 –20 –2 –23 –6 –4 –9
Change as % of
base beneﬁts 2.4 1.3 3.7 –15.0 –1.8 –16.8 –4.1 –2.7 –6.9
Option value—S2
Beneﬁts 6 1 6 –35 6 –29 –15 1 –13
After-tax income 4 –1 4 –35 20 –16 –10 7 –3
Taxes
Payroll 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Income 1 0 1 0 3 3 –5 2 –2
VAT 1 0 1 –11 6 –5 –3 2 –1
Total 3 0 2 –10 9 –1 –8 5 –3
Net change 3 1 4 –25 –3 –27 –7 –3 –10
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts 2.2 0.8 3.0 –17.7 –2.0 –19.8 –5.1 –2.4 –7.5
Option value—S3
Beneﬁts 6 12 18 –35 6 –29 –15 –7 –22
After-tax income 4 –2 2 –35 20 –16 –10 –3 –13
Taxes
Payroll 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Income 1 9 10 0 3 3 –5 5 0
VAT 1 –1 1 –11 6 –5 –3 –1 –4
Total 3 8 11 –10 9 –1 –8 4 –4
Net change 3 4 7 –25 –3 –27 –7 –11 –18
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts 2.2 2.7 4.9 –17.7 –2.0 –19.8 –5.1 –8.0 –13.0
Peak value—S1
Beneﬁts 6 1 7 –29 7 –22 –12 0 –12
After-tax income 5 –1 4 –29 21 –8 –8 6 –2
Taxes
Payroll 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Income 1 0 1 0 3 3 –4 2 –2
VAT 1 0 1 –9 6 –2 –2 2 –1
Total 3 0 2 –9 9 0 –6 4 –3
Net change 3 2 5 –20 –2 –23 –6 –4 –10
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts 2.4 1.2 3.6 –14.9 –1.7 –16.6 –4.1 –3.0 –7.1
Peak value—S2
Beneﬁts 6 1 6 –35 6 –29 –15 1 –13
After-tax income 4 –1 4 –35 18 –17 –10 7 –3
Taxes
Payroll 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Income 1 0 1 0 3 3 –5 2 –2
VAT 1 0 1 –11 6 –5 –3 2 –1
Total 3 0 2 –10 9 –2 –8 4 –3
(continued)It may appear counterintuitive that the eﬀect of the Three-Year Reform
on PDV under the age-dummy speciﬁcation results in more beneﬁts paid
out in spite of delayed eligibility to retirement programs, that is, a 6,000
Euro increase due to the mechanical eﬀect in table 3.4. However, this ﬁnd-
ing can be explained by (1) retirement taking place through PEW at ages
63 or older after the Three-Year Reform means more years of PEW enti-
tlement (extended to age 69), which is more generous than the previously
entitled OAP and (2) that retirement taking place between 60 and 62 now
means receipt of disability instead of PEW at these ages, which more than
makes up for the loss of OAP between 67 and 69. Thus, (1) and (2) could
lead to larger gross SSW under the Three-Year Reform, particularly as the
loss of OAP under (2) occurs in the future and is small, due to discounting
and mortality probabilities, while on the other hand expected DI payments
are generous enough to oﬀset these losses, even given the low probabilities
of disability in this age range. However, a mitigating factor is that tax col-
lections also rise because of delayed retirement, and the net eﬀect is that
PDV of beneﬁts increases 12.9 percent, the change in PDV being about 5
percent of base level. While in the Common and particularly in the Actu-
arial Reform case, the generosity of beneﬁts is signiﬁcantly reduced by the
6 percent actuarial reduction of the NRA beneﬁts, which is particularly
taxing in the instance where the NRA is still retained at 67. This is because
these reforms essentially eliminate the costly PEW early retirement pro-
gram. This, in turn, has a strong eﬀect on consumption and earnings, so
that taxes also go down, but the net eﬀect is still a large saving.
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Table 3.4 continued
Change in present discounted value
Three-Year Reform Actuarial Reform Common Reform
Mechanical Behavioral Total Mechanical Behavioral Total Mechanical Behavioral Total
Net change 3 1 4 –24 –3 –27 –7 –3 –10
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts 2.2 0.8 3.0 –17.7 –1.9 –19.5 –5.0 –2.3 –7.3
Peak value—S3
Beneﬁts 6 12 18 –35 6 –29 –15 –7 –21
After-tax income 4 –2 2 –35 18 –17 –10 –9 –19
Taxes
Payroll 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Income 1 9 10 0 3 3 –5 5 0
VAT 1 –1 1 –11 6 –5 –3 –3 –6
Total 3 8 11 –10 9 –2 –8 2 –5
Net change 3 4 7 –24 –3 –27 –7 –9 –16
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts 2.2 2.7 4.9 –17.7 –1.9 –19.5 –5.0 –6.3 –11.43.6 Conclusions
We study the ﬁscal implications for the government’s budgetary situa-
tion resulting from a set of reforms to the social security system, traced
through a particular cohort of workers aged 50 in 1995. Compared to the
system that was in place in 1995, the reforms involve either a mandatory in-
crease in program eligibility age, a move to an actuarially fair system, or
the implementation of a simple uniﬁed system that is common across coun-
tries. Although future demographic changes in Denmark are projected to
be smaller than in other OECD countries, they are expected nonetheless to
have potentially big consequences for public-sector ﬁnances, as labor-force
participation is already at high levels. Therefore, it becomes imperative to
consider alternative ways to delay retirement and to gain an understand-
ing of the implied ﬁscal consequences thereof. Our results show that the
biggest savings are obtained under the Actuarial Reform, which, by re-
placing the PEW (existing early retirement) program by an actuarially fair
beneﬁts system, implies a large ﬁscal saving for the government. In the
Danish case, changes in program rules largely drive the ﬁscal implications
of the reforms, and behavioral eﬀects are in general relatively smaller.
However, small behavioral eﬀects are to be expected, because disability
continues to be a possible exit route from the labor market, even with re-
duced access and program generosity.
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